c. Solution of the Third Doubt

70. As to the third doubt [n.51] I say that this respect of inherence is posterior to the whiteness, just as universally a respect founded on something is posterior to the foundation.

71. And when you say [n.51] that therefore whiteness does not necessarily require a term for the respect, I deny the consequence; for something can well depend on the term of a respect and yet not depend on the respect if the respect is posterior to it (for thus does the substance of a stone not depend on the respect of the stone to God, but rather conversely, provided they were diverse things, and yet the stone would depend essentially on God, who is the term of the respect).

72. As to the proposition [n.51] “whiteness only requires a subject because of the respect,” I reply: ‘because of’ in the sense of necessarily following the nature of the foundation, but not ‘because of’ in the sense of being required for the nature of the foundation as something prior to it. And because it is a ‘because of’ in the former way, it is not necessary that it be required in the same order in which the term of the respect is required.

73. Hereby as to the following point in the same place [“it can be defined completely without a subject,” n.51], which is still touching on the definition of accident, I concede that whiteness can be understood as to anything included in the idea of whiteness in the first mode per se,The first mode of per se is when the predicate belongs to the essence of the subject (as in ‘man is rational’), while the second mode is when the subject belongs to the essence of the predicate (as in ‘man is capable of laughter’). ³⁹ without understanding anything of the respect.

74. And when it is said that therefore it could be defined by its essential parts [n.51], the concession has been made that some idea of it could be assigned that indicates, through the essential parts, the whole essence of it; yet it would not be a definition because it would not be expressive of the perfect concept, for the understanding, when it has this concept, would always depend on something else that is the term of the dependence of the concept [n.42].

75. And when you argue that if the respect is not necessarily concomitant, then the term too of the respect is not required for the understanding of a white thing [n.51], I deny the consequence (speaking of complete concept and one satisfying in intelligibility), since for this is required that the term be understood, but it is not required that the respect to the term be understood as well.

76. And this last fact [sc. respect to the term] makes clear the whole of this conclusion [sc. the third, n. 30] and the response to the three preceding arguments [sc. the doubts, nn.46-51]; for inherence is a certain respect